This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations that are in the core. These equilibria have positive stocks of outside money in every generation, and they support Pareto-optimal equilibrium allocations. These equilibria are thus self-enforcing, and introducing money into an economy with infinitely many agents need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution designed to enforce sequential contracts between generations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E40, E60, C71.
Introduction
This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations with positive stocks of outside money in every period that are in the core. Since the coalition of the whole cannot improve upon the equilibrium allocations, they are Pareto optimal. Thus introducing positive stocks of an outside asset may entail that some agent in a future generation will be taxed to service the generational debt. I show below that there are economies in which the trade between generations is sufficiently important so that infinitely many future generations are willing to be taxed in order to service a prior debt.
In the simplest versions of models of overlapping generations, positive stocks of an outside asset may support Walrasian equilibrium allocations that are not in the core. 1 The (loose) intuition is that agents in later generations have an incentive to renege on any generational debt they have inherited and then issue their own inside money as an asset for future generations. But this note presents an example of a monetary economy in which each generation's temptation to renege on the stock of past debt is weaker than the gains from trade between the generations alive in each period.
This example is robust with respect to changes in endowments, preferences, and monetary policies, and it extends the results of Esteban and Millan [7] to economies in which the present value of the stock of debt is not constant. Those authors show that Walrasian equilibria with constant positive stocks of outside assets cannot support equilibria in the core, and they conclude that Gale [10] was correct in emphasizing that introducing money into a Walrasian system was analogous to creating a new social institution. This note shows that such a conclusion may be true for large economies, but it is not uniformly true for economies with only a few agents in each generation. 1 2 , and the normalization is p , the sum of all injections of the fiat asset that have occurred
Notation and Definitions
is the profile of the stock of the fiat asset. 3 Note that h H ∈ 0 is endowed with commodities only in the (first and) last period of her life. 4 Again, h H ∈ 0 consumes commodities only in the last period of her life. 5 Agent h H ∈ 0 has a utility function u h :
Agent h H ∈ 0 receives tax-transfers only in the last period of her life 7 It is implicit that y h
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a sequence of goods prices and asset prices and a corresponding list of equilibrium allocations and asset demands:
In a perfect foresight equilibrium, the present price of the fiat asset is a constant; hence, The example used in the proof is robust with respect to changes in endowments and preferences. A monetary equilibrium is in the core if the gains from trade between generations are sufficiently important. 13 Also, the example shows that the present price of the asset matters; the wellbeing of the initial generation is increasing in the present value of the stock of debt of which it is the beneficiary. Further, the example is robust with respect to the generational policy underlying the monetary equilibrium. Thus there is nothing special about the monetary economy described in the 11 The non-monetary equilibrium is a generalization of Gale's [9] classical equilibrium. It is in what Esteban and Millan [7] call the classical set. 12 Note that | / | q p h h 0 0 µ ω ε ⋅ ≥ > for every h H ∈ in the example in the proof. Hence, these taxe-transfers can be an important portion of each generation's aggregate resources. 13 Fisher [8] has argued that gains from trade between agents in the same generation are also important in describing monetary equilibria supporting allocations in the core.
proof. Indeed, economies in which trade between generation is important and whose long-run real interest rates exceed the rate of growth of resources may be the norm, not the exception, in our world.
The arguments in Esteban and Millan [7, Proposition 7] can be used to show that the monetary equilibrium described in the proof of the proposition will not be in the core of a sufficiently large economy. if h H t ∈ with t ≥ 1.
An equilibrium for this economy is supported by the same sequence of prices given in the proof above,
and it is possible to show that the equilibrium allocations are in the core of any replication of this economy. Such an economy does not contradict Esteban and Millan [7, Proposition 7] because the Gaussian curvature on each consumer's indifference curve evaluated at the equilibrium allocations is not bounded. 14 But these preferences and endowments create such a strong inter-dependence on trade between generations that no coalition consisting of a subset of agents from two different generations can improve upon the equilibrium allocations. Of course, this particular example is not robust because it depends so crucially on the fact that goods within each period are perfect complements in each agent's preferences.
